Are Shale Plays economic with $4 Natural Gas?
introduction
Natural gas prices fell in 2008 and recovered only feebly. Some are arguing that low prices reflect the presence of huge natural gas reserves. It is a glut of gas that is driving prices. Others are arguing that such gas reserves have been systematically over-booked by companies and over-estimated by engineers. Actual ultimate recovery and production per well will be significantly less. This would signify that the companies are deliberately lying about their reserves or are incorrectly calculating the reserves.
Either scenario has major implications for gas pricing. If low prices reflect the premise that a huge glut exists and the reserves are over-stated, then restating reserves would result in higher natural gas pricing thus improving the economics of shale drilling.
But if the glut is real, then chronic low prices will make drilling for additional reserves uneconomic. The SEC should revise the practice of allowing PUD – proven undeveloped- gas to be booked by public companies. Unbooking those reserves would reduce the implied reserves which should help prices and thus generate more income for the companies. PUD reserves do not generate income and no bank should be lending on the basis of undeveloped reserves.
The Decline Curve Dilemma
Classic Decline Curve analysis is well explained here
http://www.fekete.com/software/rta/media/webhelp/c-te-analysis.htm
This internet link examines all the variations in decline curves from Exponential decline (b = 0) , Hyperbolic decline (b = > 0 and < 1) , Harmonic Decline ( b = 1) and where the b factor exceeds 1 or is variable over the life of the well. Any search engine should produce a number of useful links explaining decline curves.
Perhaps the most important thing to understand comes from a statement in report linked above.
- “Decline curve analysis is based on empirical observations of production rate decline, and not on theoretical derivations.”
Implicit in that is to say knowledgeable engineers and geologists can disagree over the issues surrounding curve analysis. The Arps’ curve is not a hard and fast rule rather is a rule that has to be fitted to the project at hand. The issue is reserves and how they are calculated and projected into the future. Older texts and reservoir engineers use mostly decline curves which actually measure the decline in production using a formula known by its author, Arps. The Arps formula traditionally uses an exponent that is called the “b” factor. If that factor is zero, then it is called exponential decline – a straight line if you will. If between 0 – 1 it is generally referred to as a hyperbolic decline. But if the factor exceeds 1 then eyebrows used to be raised and most reservoir engineers were reluctant to use it. But the shale plays suggest that the B factor may be well over 1 and in fact, is often projected at 1.5 or greater in shale plays. This is called a “Power Law” decline.
Using the Power law decline a well may last 65 years or longer and have far larger reserves than if a more conservative “B” factor is used. But although reserves may be double under the power low scenario, the net present value of the gas may only increase by 5 or 6% because the value is eroded by the time – value of money. Investors rarely have 65 year time lines and expect their investments to pay off quicker.
The problem in use of the Arps formula is that over the short term, the actual shape of the decline curve is difficult to vet. With only a year or two of data, the rapidly declining production curve may mistakenly be interpreted as an exponential decline, a hyperbolic decline or a power law decline. That is further complicated by changes in nearby wells (which may communicate) or by actions taken to correct mechanical problems or actual refraccing of a well. As one wag put it, the decline curve is only accurate after you have depleted the well past the economic limit.
Dr. Terry Engelder, professor of Geosciences at Penn State on the Basin Oil & Gas site found at http://fwbog.com/index.php?page=article&article=144 , pointed out
- The best fit curve for the Chesapeake pro forma curve follows a power-law rate decline with a poor fit to initial production (Fig. 3A). The shape of the three most commonly used production-decline curves, depending on circumstances, are an exponential rate decline, a hyperbolic rate decline, and a harmonic rate decline (Fig. 3B). A power-law rate decline is steeper than the three traditional rate decline curves.
- So little public data is available on Marcellus decline that it is impossible to grade the Chesapeake pro forma curve with confidence …
Thus the question remains. Can Chesapeake’s numbers be relied upon? Are we totally confident that those numbers are not “inflated” just as real estate appraisers inflated values for homes during the housing boom? And can we expect even third party vendors to have been under considerable pressure by their clients to see that the bright side of things? There is also something called the anchoring bias. Anchoring induces a bias into the person by suggesting that a higher or lower result would be better. Even though the engineer or estimator may not realize it, they may have been “contaminated” by the power of suggestion.
But under the best of circumstance, the engineers don’t agree whether they are getting the “best fit” to the decline curve for a hyperbolic decline, a power law decline or a hybrid that truncates the hyperbolic decline after some fixed period.
One really has to question the wisdom of seeking to make the curve match the data vs. making the data match the curve. Are we doing shale gas decline analysis in a consistent fashion, or are we attempting to maximize EUR (expected ultimate reserves.)
Ultimately outsiders can interpret EUR only by use of publicly available data, specifically monthly gas production reported by the companies themselves. If the method has a weakness beyond the difficulties raised above, then the question is what is the alternative?
Alternative Measurements
The alternative to decline curves is to determine gas by volumetrics. Unfortunately, that is only accurate based on the available data and such data are limited to the companies themselves. Although they do generally use outside vendors to provide estimates based on seismic data, well logs, cores, and perm/porosity measurements, even then the #600 gorilla in this room is the “recovery factor”. Is it 10%, 20% or more? One intuitively knows that if all the factors except recovery are accounted for to the Nth degree, the difference between a recovery factor (F) of 15% and 30% would double or halve the reserve estimate.
Engineering firms like Schlumberger are vendors and compete for business Will they end up being like real estate appraisers in the housing bubble and prove to be too optimistic as well? Maybe. During the past “Oil Boom” of 1974 – 1981, the investment houses of Wall Street created drilling partnerships. These were sold to wealthy taxpayers facing huge tax bills. The depletion allowance (that $5 billion tax break for big oil that is a heckofalot more valuable to small oil than big…) allowed investors to write off dry hole costs in Year 0. This deferred taxes and if the well was a dry hole, then at least the investor didn’t have to pay tax on the investment. With 50% tax rates and higher, investors lowered the actual risk.
Nevertheless, these drilling funds were such bad deals even a good well rarely paid off of fund investors. The same couldn’t be said of the investment houses of Wall Street that made a killing on fees promoted to the wealthy oil investor.
Sensible people would wonder just how solid an investment in nat gas from shale gas is. Are the reserves really there? Are they going to require frequent re-fraccing to get that gas? Are costs really going to come down as technology improves?
Price, Cost, Volume
Pricing in the natural gas fields is partially a problem of determining economic limits. What is the terminal point when price of product, cost of production, and future volumes are all moving targets? The “science” of decline analysis is more art than science. It is subject to speculation and conjecture.
But no matter how accurately one predicts volumes (the only thing decline analysis can do), price or costs could change the metric. Likewise, no price will save a well which has simply stopped producing. Therein lays the rub, as Shakespeare might put it.
What do these wells cost? And how much money do they generate and how is that pie sliced? I saw Aubrey McClendon’s rebuttal to the NYT article (June 26, 2011) on Jim Cramer’s Mad Money show (CNBC) the following week. Even Chesapeake’s own geologist that was quoted (who probably doesn’t have a job anymore since McClendon indicated on Mad Money that they know who that geologist was) wondered if the wells could actually produce for extended years.
McClendon raged on in a 1300 word memo blaming environmentalists for the New York Times article. https://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=10150305143547565
McClendon launched an ad hominem attack on a “third tier geologist who thinks he is a reservoir engineer”. He was undoubtedly referring to Arthur Berman who has been a frequent critic of the shale play economics and whose column was discontinued by World Oil over the issue, apparently under pressure from advertisers. Berman was not an employee of World Oil Magazine, but the editor who oversaw him was fired. Berman has a blog http://petroleumtruthreport.blogspot.com/
However, Aubrey was coy about the real issues raised by Berman. Berman isn’t worried about the ultimate amount of shale gas that may be recovered at some future data, but rather expects an honest accounting of the total expenses associated with individual wells and if that impacts the reserve issues raised by the article. Are these companies being coy with the facts or truthfully telling us about the real economics of shale gas at $4 per MCF.
Early wells in the Fayetteville play were rarely over 2,000′ lateral (horizontal) but today those laterals are typically over 4,000′ long and are fracked in multiple stages, often fracking several nearby wells at once creating an interconnection of the fracture systems. Thus individual wells will produce far more than before. My concern that I expressed in the O & G Journal letter was that individual wells may make more gas, but the overall production per unit or acre may not increase significantly.
In my opinion, the SEC made a serious mistake by allowing companies to “book” reserves based on PUD – Proven undeveloped – acreage. Proven undeveloped is an oxymoron as “development” (drilling) may “prove” that it isn’t there and the individual wells are performing far less uniform than many believe. The SEC requires these companies to drill those PUD locations within 5 years and so there is a lot of scrambling to drill for the numbers rather than where the best locations are. Others, like McClendon, argue that they control much more reserves than the SEC allows them to book.
There is only one problem. The companies are using forced pooling to pool interest in these plays and in doing so they are controlling mineral rights that they do not OWN. They lease them and the lease terms are generally not more than five years. But by careful use of pooling, they are holding these leases while the royalty owners are getting stiffed and are not seeing their interests being developed properly and in a timely manner. They can give up those leases at any moment but the mineral owner is unable to develop or re-lease to someone else.
Here are some salient points to remember
Low product prices are hurting the gas companies and the break even price for gas is likely well above the current market price. This is really the gist of the natural gas argument. If the reserves stated are inflated, then the appearance of having a large surplus of gas is depressing the price. But to restate the reserves would invite an SEC investigation or stockholder lawsuit.
The major Arkansas based companies, mostly found in El Dorado and Ft. Smith, are virtually absent in the Fayetteville Shale play. Southwestern Energy is alone among Arkansas companies. This is a reflection of the skepticism of the “old heads” – the geologists and engineers that run those companies. Also, shale gas requires a lot of cash and the logistics of managing the huge number of wells is enormous.
The Barnett shale is maturing and production is already declining significantly as drilling rigs leave for the oily (a. k. a. – Liquids Rich) plays in the Eagle-Ford and Bakken. Individual companies are widely variable in their projections for well performance. Some are saying their wells will produce double that of other horizontal drillers.
Jason Baihly, Raphael Altman, Raj Malpani and Fang Luo, all Schlumberger engineers, authored a special report for The American Oil & Gas Reporter magazine (May 2011 issue) recently and did a study of the shale decline rates. Ultimately they concluded those with the lowest lease costs and lowest royalty payments had a much easier economic metric to vet but at spot pricing, few plays could claim to be “economic”. Since many companies had hedged positions which kept the price above the $4 level, they could claim to be profitable.
If low prices are sustained however, those hedges will ultimately expire and the pressure to hedge at break even pricing could hurt their prospect of rapid recovery should the prices break to the up side.
There are clearly better areas within a play. Southwestern Energy was first in leasing the Fayetteville and it is quite apparent they have better economics than other players. First, they bought the most desirable leases with the highest carbon content as well as a favorable geologic structure. Secondly, most of their leases are 1/8th royalty meaning they get to keep a much higher percentage of the proceeds than the late-to-the-table players like Chesapeake and XTO who often gave lease royalty amounts up to 20% or more.
My own assessment is that about 20% of the wells are very profitable. Probably 50% make no profit and the balance are break even prospects… production declined to near the cost of maintenance before the well did anything other than pay for the drilling and fracking. Just on a subjective basis, I was think a well that makes 1.5 BCF (billion cu. ft) of gas and costs no more than $4 million would be considered a successful well under the prices seen in the Fayetteville since the summer of 2008.
I am unconcerned about the individual well performance. If laterals continue to grow then the EUR of individual wells will increase but does that improve the EUR of the unit as a whole? I have some doubts about it and can think of no drilling unit in the Fayetteville where 30 BCF gas has been produced, in fact, none over 15 BCF. In a speech one mover shaker argued that they had discovered “thirty to forty” BCF of gas per unit (Square mile). Since 8 long laterals will completely penetrate a section on 660’ spacings, I have to question how all those interconnected wells will average 4 – 5 BCF each. I don’t think they can do it and certainly not without additional fraccing and re-completion efforts that cost enormous amounts of money. It doesn’t add up.